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The covid-19 pandemic that was declared on 11 March 2020
has affected countries on all continents.1 Reported case numbers
are certainly underestimates given the shortages or unavailability
of test kits in many countries, a virus with a basic reproductive
value (R
0
) of 2.2, and evidence of viral shedding from
asymptomatic infected people.1-4 In addition to suspending travel
and efforts to reduce crowds, countries are taking unprecedented
measures, including wartime strategies to enhance production
of medical supplies in the US, the use of the national guard to
restrict movement of people, and suspension of exports of
medical products from certain countries (Saudi Arabia, India).5-8
Our challenge is to make the best use of available tools through
systematic implementation by communities and countries to
mitigate the exponential spread of covid-19.
Community mitigation
No specific drugs or vaccines are available, and health systems
are overburdened everywhere. We have to rely on targeted,
non-coercive, community interventions with sufficient
transparency and public engagement and trust, and implement
them urgently (box 1).9-11 Such measures may help delay the
exponential spread of the outbreak until drugs become available.
Transparency and trust are critical to preserving a calm and
compliant response to mitigation advice among the public.
Box 1: Key community mitigation strategies
• Cancellation of ad hoc events and suspension of events with
superspreader potential
• Use of social distancing measures to reduce direct and close contact
between people in the community
• Travel restrictions, including reduced flights and public transport and
route restrictions without compromising essential services
• Voluntary home quarantine of members of household contacts
• Changes to funeral services to minimise crowd size and exposure to
body fluids of the diseased
• Clear communication from national and international health authorities
to ensure verified information and avoid fake news, rumours, and panic
Mass gatherings and events such as music festivals, religious
gatherings, cultural celebrations, conferences, and political
events should be restricted. Respiratory infections are most
commonly transmitted at such events.12 Even when the R
0
 is
low, the crowd density during mass gatherings predisposes to
high rates of transmission. On 27 February 2020 Saudi Arabia
suspended the year round Umrah pilgrimage, and the
transmission of covid-19 in the country has been low.1 This
contrasts with Iran, which did not intervene in the religious
pilgrimage in Qom and has seen large regional outbreaks.
Organisers of other mass gatherings—including the 2020
Olympic Games, Dubai Expo 2020, and Hajj pilgrimage—will
need to make decisions about risks and benefits.1 9-11 13
Social distancing measures—decreasing the frequency and
duration of social contacts among people of all ages—reduces
person-to-person transmission of the virus. The closure of
schools and universities, childcare facilities, religious services,
entertainment venues, and other places where people congregate
is an important such measure. Schools and daycare centres
represent the most socially dense environment (3-5 m2/child)
compared with offices (18 m2/person) or homes (36-44
m2/person).14 15
Although current data do not indicate that children are especially
susceptible to covid-19, adults who interact in school settings
are at risk, and children with underlying conditions or those
living in areas with high disease transmission rates may be
carriers. School closures cannot be implemented without
workplace level interventions, distance and remote learning,
and school meal options for children in need.
Office space is another enabling environment for respiratory
disease transmission. New shift work and rotation schedules
seeking to decrease social density can minimise disease
propagation. Telemedicine, video conferencing, telecommuting,
and expanded leave policies may help staff adhere to social
distancing policies.
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Travel is the single most important contributor to disease
transmission.2 Absolute travel bans may increase fear and affect
the travel of essential staff and the timely movement of supplies.
Home deliveries of essential commodities may be feasible in
some communities. Reduced frequency of transport (flights,
trains) and route restrictions could be proposed, along with
community sensitisation, aiming to reduce the demand for travel.
Institutional quarantining of people who have been in contact
with confirmed or probable cases is unrealistic during pandemics
as it overwhelms the system and may lead to more infections.16
Voluntary home quarantine reduces stress on the emergency
healthcare system. Although family clusters of infections may
occur, the numbers of affected people are likely to be far lower
than in institutional settings. Telehealth concepts—including
virtual urgent care centres—could be expanded to triage people
quarantined at home.
In many countries and some communities, funerals are
conducted in the homes of those who died; this was a key
determinant of the Ebola outbreak.11 Given the role of body
fluids in viral transmission, and because of crowding during
funerals in some settings, new guidelines on funerals are
required.11 Early risk communication strategies may help
improve adherence among the population.
Timing
Some countries have already implemented community mitigation
measures. Country specific timing is a critical determinant of
their impact. Studies on travel restrictions in China for covid-192
and anecdotal evidence from the 1918 influenza pandemic in
the US cities of Philadelphia and St Louis show the importance
of early action in delaying outbreaks.10 Slowing down the spread
to manageable levels will help medical staff to provide adequate
care to infected patients and maintain social order. It will also
mitigate burnout among healthcare providers and delay potential
virological and immunological changes of the pathogen.
Appropriate action in individual communities and countries can
benefit the entire world.
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